SECURITIES-TRANSANATIONAL

APPLICATION OF ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS EXPANDED--SEC

v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938

(1977).
Churchill Forest Industries (CFI), a Canadian corporation with
an office in New Jersey, and River Sawmills Company (River), a Delaware corporation, entered into investment contracts with the Manitoba Development Fund (the Fund).1 In Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Kasser2 these agreements became the basis of an action seeking injunctive and ancillary relief 3 for alleged violations of
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 4 Alexander
Kasser, a United States citizen, owned and controlled both CFI and
River. 5 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleged that
Kasser, along with other individual and corporate defendants, had induced the Fund to enter into agreements with the two corporations
on the basis of false representations in violation of section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)6 and section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 7 In accordance with the agreements,

1 SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977). The
Fund was "wholly owned by the Province of Manitoba, Canada." 548 F.2d at 111. Its
purpose was to encourage the private sector to "creat[e] ... a forestry development in
that province." Id. Accordingly, the proceeds derived from the investment contracts
with CFI and River were to be used "to establish the forestry development." Id.
2 548 F.2d 109, 111-12, 112 n.7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
3 548 F.2d at 112. The injunction was sought to prevent further violations of the
federal securities laws. Id. The requested ancillary relief included an accounting and
restitution. SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167, 1169 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 548 F.2d 109
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
4 548 F.2d at 111-12, 112 n.7.
5 SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167, 1169 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977). Alexander Kasser also "owned and dominated" other
corporate defendants through which the defrauded funds were filtered. 548 F.2d at 111.
6 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); 548 F.2d at 111, 112 & n.7.
7 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 548 F.2d at 111, 112 & n.7. The SEC also alleged a
violation of SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). 548 F.2d at 111, 112 & n. 7 .
Kasser and his associates had represented that they would make equity investments in
both CFI and River when, in fact, they never intended to do so. Id. at 111. Furthermore, after the initial investment, the defendants continued to falsely represent that the
monies were being used to finance the development of a forestry when in fact they
were being converted to their personal use. Id. It was alleged that this was a material
misrepresentation in violation of SEC Rule lob-5. Id. at 112 n.7. The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interestate [sic] commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
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the Fund, upon being informed that the defendants had made the
requisite equity investments in each corporation, advanced loans to
CFI and River in exchange for their debentures. 8 However, contrary
to the agreements, the proceeds of each loan were used to make the
necessary equity investments for subsequent loans. 9 The complaint
further alleged that Kasser and the other defendants had converted
the proceeds of the loans to their personal use, thereby bankrupting
both CFI and River. 10
The SEC recognized that neither corporation had stock registered or traded on an organized American securities exchange and
that there was minimal, if any, impact upon the United States securities markets since the sole defrauded party was a foreign corporation.1 1 Nevertheless, in support of their contention that the federal
district court had subject matter jurisdiction, the SEC alleged that
substantial activity in furtherance of the fraud had been conducted
within the United States. l2 These activities included various negotiations, the execution of at least one investment contract, the use of
interstate commerce and the processing of the fraudulently obtained
money through the New York branch of a Swiss bank.13
The district court, upon motion by the defendants, dismissed the
action stating that subject matter jurisdiction could not be based upon
"conduct without effect in the United States.'1 4 The Court of Appeals
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), proscribes similar conduct
in connection with the initial offering of securities.
8 548 F.2d at 111.
9 Id. By employing this "'ponzi'-like scheme," id., the defendants were able to induce the Fund to advance approximately $38 million to CFI and eight million dollars to
River. SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167, 1171, 1172 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 548 F.2d 109
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
10 548 F.2d at 111.
*1 Id. at 112.
12 See id. at 111-12.
13 Id. at 111. The complaint also alleged the following contacts with the United
States: the corporate defendants either had an office in this country or were incorporated
here; some of the agreements were drafted in the United States but executed elsewhere;
the business records relating to the fraudulent transactions were maintained in this country; and the monies received were passed through United States banks. Id.
14 Id. at 112 (emphasis added). The district court stated that there may be "a legitimate governmental interest in applying the securities legislation to Americans who
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for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the acts of the defendants
in the United States were sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 15
The language of the 1934 Act leaves open the issue of whether
the Act's protective powers apply to the claims of individuals victimized by a transnational securities fraud. 16 Nowhere in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, nor in its jurisdictional provision, is there
a limitation of subject matter jurisdiction. 17 One purpose of the 1934
fraudulently issue securities in essentially foreign transactions." SEC v. Kasser, 391 F.
Supp. 1167, 1177 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977). Nonetheless, it found jurisdiction to be lacking in Kasser since the conduct
within the United States only amounted to " 'miscellaneous acts.' " 548 F.2d at 112. The
court added that it "was not the proper forum for adjudication of th[at] controversy." 391
F. Supp. at 1177. Interestingly, the court of appeals read the district court's opinion as
assuming that certain conditions could give rise to jurisdiction but that the miscellaneous character of the acts in Kasser were insufficient for subject matter jurisdiction in that
case. See 548 F.2d at 112.
15 548 F.2d at 111-12.
16 The 1934 Act's jurisdictional provision, section 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), provides that
[t]he district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of
any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of [the 1934 Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits . . . brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder .... Any suit or
action to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business....
17 See id. There has been ample discussion of this issue both in case law and commentary. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.) (court
unable to cite any statutory language concerning jurisdiction), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); Venture Fund (Int'l) N.V. v. Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550,
554 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("no explicit Congressional learning on the subject" of jurisdiction);
SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (there is
no provision in either the 1933 or 1934 Act which would restrict the protection of their
anti-fraud provisions to American residents only); Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
91,615, at 95,310, 95,310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(neither the legislative history nor the statute itself suggests a congressional intent concerning its extraterritorial application). See also Comment, The TransnationalReach of
Rule 10b-,5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1973); Note, American Adjudication of
Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 553 & n.4 (1976); 34 OHiO ST.
L. J. 342, 342 (1973); 20 WAYNE L. REV. 167, 168-69 (1973).

It can be inferred that there was in fact some congressional concern with fraudulent
transnational transactions which resulted in the enactment of section 30(b) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976). Comment, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational
Securities Fraud, 3 OHio N.U.L. REV. 1305, 1314 (1976). This provision provides that
[t]he provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contraven-
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Act, as stated in the title, is the prevention of "inequitable and unfair
practices on [securities] exchanges and markets" through the use of
interstate or foreign commerce. 18 Interstate commerce, as defined by
the statute, includes "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any foreign country and any State."' 19 Furthermore, the anti-fraud provision of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act expressly forbids the use, by any person, of the instruments of interstate commerce in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. 2 0 In the
absence of a specific statutory reference, the responsibility for determining the transnational scope of the securities acts has been left to
21
the courts.
The Second Circuit has provided the leading case law concerning
the transnational application of the anti-fraud provisions of the se-

tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.
The decision of Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), interpreted the statute
as exempting from the 1934 Act those transactions outside of the United States which
are done pursuant to a business in securities. Id. at 390-91. Although section 30(b) of
the 1934 Act specifically addresses the issue of a person who conducts a securities business, one court has interpreted this also to exempt the isolated transaction
since it reasoned that if Congress had intended to exempt a business it must also have
intended to exempt the isolated transaction. Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 191,615 at 95,310, 95,311 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Note,
ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
94,106 (1969). This view was rejected by the Second Circuit. Schoebaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 1968). The Schoenbaum court did not read the statute as exempting all transactions outside the United States since Congress expressly exempted
only those persons who transact a business in securities. Id. For a discussion of section
30(b) of the 1934 Act, see 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW § 11.2 (570), at 246.11-12
(1975); 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 37.02, at 2-24 to -25 (1977); Comment,
supra, 121 U. PA. L. REV. at 1390-91.
18 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title, 48 Stat. 881. The statement of
purpose in the 1934 Act would seem to contemplate extraterritorial application since it
was "[t]o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter
markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets." Id. (emphasis added);
accord, Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title, 48 Stat. 74 (purpose of 1933 Act "full and
fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce");
see Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,011, at 90,726, 90,736 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); S. REP. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
19 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (17) (1976). Although the 1933 Act similarly defines " 'interstate commerce,' " id. § 77b(7), neither Act provides a definition of "foreign commerce." See 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77bbbb (1976); 1934 Act, id. §§ 78a to 78kk.
20

Id. 78j(b) (1976).

See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975) (in the absence of specific statutory mandate the court relied
on prior law and commentary).
21
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curities laws. 22 In the first of these cases, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,23 the court held that the congressional interest in protecting domestic investors and the domestic securities market warranted
a finding in favor of extraterritorial application.2 4 The plaintiff, an
American citizen who held stock in a Canadian corporation, alleged
damages due to the insider trading of defendant directors.2 5 The
court found that all of the fraudulent activities had occurred outside
the United States.2 6 However, the facts that the stock was registered
with the SEC, traded on a domestic securities exchange and the
transaction was detrimental to an American investor were considered
to be of "a sufficiently serious effect upon United States commerce to"
warrant subject matter jurisdiction.2 7 The Schoenbaum decision was,
22 See 548 F.2d at 113; Note, supra note 17, 89 HARV. L. REV. at 571. Justice
Blackmun has referred to the Second Circuit as the " 'Mother Court' " of securities law.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
23 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
24 405 F.2d at 206. The district court had been of the opinion that the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws had no extraterritorial application and therefore held
that no liability existed because of the foreign character of the transaction. Shoenbaum
v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d
200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
25 405 F.2d at 204. It was alleged that the insider trading caused the corporation to
lose approximately $10 million upon the sale of its treasury stock. Id. at 205. Although
the district court had found the sole injured party to be the foreign corporation, Judge
Lumbard, writing for the court of appeals, found that the loss had caused a reduction in
the equity of the corporation resulting in lower offers for the plaintiff's stock. Id. at 208.

26 Id. at 206.

27 Id. at 208-09 (emphasis added).
The

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

FOREIGN

RELATIONS

LAW

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES § 18(a) (1965) states that
[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if...
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed
legal systems....

Cf. id., Reporters' Notes, n.2 at 53 (anti-trust violations). For a discussion of an "effect"
within the United States as the basis of jurisdiction see 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 17, §
37.02, at 2-21 to -22; Mizrack, Recent Developments in the ExtraterritorialApplication
of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAW. 367, 367-72
(1975); Comment, An Interest Analysis Approach to ExtraterritorialApplication of Rule
10b-5, 52 TExAS L. REV. 983 (1974); Comment, supra note 17, 30 U. PA. L. REV. at
1378-86; 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 342 (1973).
The Schoenbaum court rejected the argument that section 30(b) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976), exempted an isolated securities transaction from the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. 405 F.2d at 207-08. For a discussion of section 30(b),
see note 17 supra.
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nonetheless, unclear as to whether subject matter jurisdiction would
attach only when both American investors and securities listed on a
domestic exchange were involved or whether either element, stand28
ing alone, would be sufficient.
Four years later in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.
v. Maxwell, 2 9 the Second Circuit held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over an action brought by an American investor since there
was substantial activity within the United States. 30 The court reached
this conclusion despite the fact that the foreign securities were not
registered with the SEC or traded on an American exchange. 3
Judge Friendly, in dicta, expressed doubt as to whether Congress
intended that jurisdiction should attach solely on the basis that the
defrauded party was an American where the stock was neither registered nor listed on a national securities exchange. 32 However, where
28See 405 F.2d at 208. The court held that the federal district courts have jurisdiction "at least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national
securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American investors." Id.
(emphasis added); 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 770, 774 (1974).
In Finch v. Marathon Sec. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), neither of the
Schoenbaum elements were present. The district court, relying upon the Schoenbau2
decision, dismissed the action due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court
reached this conclusion since the fraudulent conduct occurred outside this country, the
plaintiff and defendants were foreigners, the securities were neither registered nor
traded on an American securities exchange and no injury was shown to have occurred in
the United States. Id. at 1349.
Many courts have relied on the Schoenbaurn decision for guidance. E.g., Seizer v.
Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Manus v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,299, at 91,648,
91,650 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,011, at 90,726, 90,735 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
29 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
30Id. at 1335, 1336, 1337-38. The activities within this country consisted primarily
of meetings and the use of telephones and the mails. Id. at 1335. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit opined that if all the fraudulent acts had occurred outside the
United States, as was the case in Schoenbaum, it "would entertain [a] most serious
doubt whether" the federal securities laws would apply. Id. at 1334. The court held this
view since the defrauded part' was a foreign subsidiary of an American corporation
purchasing foreign securities which were neither registered nor traded on any organized
domestic market. Id. at 1334, 1337-38; see SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474
F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1973) (jurisdiction exists where there is substantial activity
within the United States despite the fact that mainly foreigners were defrauded);
Madonick v. Denison Mines, Ltd., [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,550,
at 95,907, 95,908 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (subject matter jurisdiction exists when substantial activity occurs within the United States); 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note 17, § 11.2 (570), at
246.13.
31468 F.2d at 1336. One author has interpreted Leasco as both going beyond
Schoenbaurs and limiting Schoenbauon to its facts. See 20 WAYNE L. REV. 167, 175
(1973).
32 468 F.2d at 1334; accord, SEC v. Capital Growth Co., S.A., 391 F. Supp. 593,
596-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (jurisdiction exists when there has been significant conduct
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fraudulent activity did occur within the United States and an American was defrauded, the fact that the foreign securities were not registered or listed on a domestic securities exchange would not, standing
33
alone, defeat subject matter jurisdiction.
Shortly after Leasco, the Second Circuit rendered two major
transnational securities fraud decisions on the same day. Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc. , and lIT v. Vencap, Ltd. ,a have been characterized as "clarifying and expanding the basis for rule 10b-5 liability
predicated on acts in the United States."3 6 At the time of these deciwithin this country or conduct "was harmful to and . . . had an impact upon United
States investors"); Seizer v. Bank of Bermuda, Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (jurisdiction may exist where stock is listed on a national exchange, or where
there are misrepresentations made in the United States, or when American investors, in
general, are defrauded); Madonick v. Denison Mines, Ltd., [Current Volume] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 94,550, at 95,907, 95,909 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (subject matter jurisdiction
can exist despite fact that foreign securities are not registered or traded on American
securities exchanges).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 17 (a) (1965) states that a nation has the power "to prescribe a rule of law ...
attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not
such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory."
The Restatement also provides the following example:
X and Y are in state A. X makes a misrepresentation to Y. X and Y go to
state B. Solely because of the prior misrepresentation, Y delivers money to X. A
has jurisdiction to prescribe a criminal penalty for obtaining money by false
pretenses.
Id. § 17, Comment a, Illustration 2.
33See 468 F.2d at 1335-36. Judge Friendly, in suggesting this line of reasoning,
phrased this question: "[I]f Congress had thought about the point . . . would [it] have
wished to protect an American investor if a foreigner comes to the United States and
fraudulently induces him to purchase foreign securities abroad." Id. at 1337. The Second Circuit subsequently held that substantial fraudulent activity within this country
"tips the scales in favor of" jurisdiction when an American corporation and its shareholders are injured by a fraudulent scheme. Id.
The Leasco court found no reason to characterize "making telephone calls and
sending mail to the United States" as conduct not within this country. Id. at 1335; see
SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (where
scheme requires use of interstate commerce, even though offer is outside the United
States, "the remedial protection of [the 1933 and 1934 Acts] may be invoked"). See also
Mizrack, supra note 27, at 384 (use of mails or interstate commerce to further fraudulent
scheme would be a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction); Comment, supra note
17, 30 OHIO N.U.L. REV. at 1307 (fraudulent representations made through instrumentalities of interstate commerce sufficient for jurisdiction); 34 OHIO ST. L. J. 342, 348-49,
351 (1973) (use of mails constituting conduct will "significantly expand the" jurisdictional scope of 10(b)). But see SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 357
(9th Cir. 1973) (court declined to rule on the "soundness" of the use of interstate commerce as the basis for jurisdiction).
34 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
35 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
36 Note, supra note 17, 89 HARV. L. REV. at 557; accord, Comment, supra note 17,
30 OHIO N.U.L. REV. at 1310; Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of § 10(b) of the Se-
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sions, there was little doubt that the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws could apply to transactions involving securities that were
neither registered nor traded on domestic securities exchanges when
37
there has been activity within the United States.
In Bersch, the court considered the justification for subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the claims of three distinct classes of
plaintiffs-American residents, 3s Americans residing abroad3 9 and
foreigners. 4 0 The complaint alleged that 1.0. S., Ltd., "an international sales and financial service" corporation, made certain offerings
based on a misleading prospectus. 4 1 Several aspects of the transaction
occurred in the United States including the drafting of a portion of
the prospectus, the opening of bank accounts and numerous meetings
"to initiate, organize and structure the offering." 42

curities Exchange Act of 1934-The Implications of Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. and
lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397, 409 (1976).
37 519 F.2d at 986. Judge Friendly had stated that "[it [was] elementary that the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to many transactions" which
are not subject to registration nor traded on a domestic exchange. Id. (emphasis added);
see Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("the usual presumption
against extra-territorial application of legislation," does not prevent application of the
securities laws to conduct "occurring outside the United States"); Investment Properties
Int'l, Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,011,
at 90,726, 90,734-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (same).
3 519 F.2d at 990-93. The court held that when American residents are defrauded,
no activity within this country is necessary for the federal district courts to have subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. at 993.
39 Id. at 992-93. The standard for subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of
Americans residing abroad is that at least some activity, including "merely preparatory"
acts, occur within the United States. Id.
40 Id. at 996-97. The class action was instituted by a United States citizen. The
members of the class included all individuals, both Americans and foreigners, who had
purchased the securities of the defendant Canadian corporation. Id. at 977-78, 981.
There were an estimated 100,000 members in the class most of whom were "citizens
and residents of Canada, Australia, England, France, Germany, Switzerland, and many
other countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America." Id.
In order for the federal district courts to have subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim of the foreign plaintiffs, the court of appeals set forth a standard requiring activity
in the United States which directly causes the loss. Id. at 993.
41Id. at 978, 981. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had falsely implied I.O.S.'s
suitability for public ownership when they should have been aware that this was incorrect; that the prospectus did not disclose the illegal activity of directors which had a
detrimental effect on I.O.S.; that the records of the company were maintained in a "chaotic condition" so that an accurate financial picture of the corporation was unattainable;
that there was a lack of due diligence by the underwriters with respect to the prospectus; and that the accountants "had failed to observe generally accepted accounting principles with the result that the financial statements were false and misleading." Id. at
981.
42 Id. at 985 n.24. Although there was no dispute concerning the presence of these
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In determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction the
court separately examined each class of plaintiffs to determine the
quantity and quality of the acts within the United States which would
"trigger" the applicability of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities
laws. 43 As to resident Americans, the Second Circuit held that the
securities laws were applicable regardless of where the fraudulent acts
occurred.44 However, the statutes' protection would extend to nonresident Americans only when activity in furtherance of the fraud occurred within the United States. 4 5 The court then stated, without
further explanation, that the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws
would not apply to transactions involving foreign plaintiffs outside the
United States in the absence of significant acts occurring within the
United States which "directly caused [the] losses." 4 6 The rationale for
treating Americans differently than foreigners 4 7 was based upon the
policy consideration that there should be subject matter jurisdiction
activities, the defendants asserted that these acts were merely "preliminary or ancillary"
in character while the majority of the acts were accomplished outside the United States.
Id.
43 See id.at 984-93. Judge Friendly noted that the absence of factors "which led to
[a] finding [ofl subject matter jurisdiction in [prior decisions] does not necessarily preclude a similar conclusion on the different facts presented" in Bersch. Id. at 986; see
Venture Fund (Int'l) N.V. v. Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y.
1976). See also SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1973)
("jurisdiction may not be resolved by a mere tallying of domiciles of" plaintiffs),
4519
F.2d at 991, 993.
45 Id. at 993. Judge Friendly was of the opinion that while "merely preparatory"
acts within the United States were insufficient to exert jurisdiction over the claims of
foreigners, they would be sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction for nonresident Americans. Id. at 992. The requirement that at least some activity occur within the
United States was based on a belief that Congress did not have a sufficient interest in
protecting Americans who go abroad and are defrauded, so long as no fraudulent activities had taken place within this country. Id.
"Id. at 993; see Note, supra note 17, 89 HARV. L. REv. at 560. The Second Circuit
summarized its holdings by stating
that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the
United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance occurred in this country; and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad
if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the
United States have significantly contributed thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the
United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the United States
directly caused such losses.
519 F.2d at 993.
47 Many of the foreign governments had indicated an intent not to recognize a
United States judgment as a bar to an action commenced by their citizens in their country. 519 F.2d at 996-97.
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only when the "injury [is] to purchasers or sellers . . .in whom the
48
United States has an interest."
In the HT case, the Second Circuit expanded the extraterritorial
scope of the securities laws beyond any previous decision. 4 9 IIT, an
international investment trust, 50 had been fraudulently induced to
purchase the preferred securities of Vencap, a Bahamian venture capital firm. 5 1 After dismissing the possibility of jurisdiction pursuant to
either diversity of citizenship, 52 pendent jurisdiction,5 3 or "actions
arising under an Act of Congress" which does not have its own
jurisdictional provisions,5 4 Judge Friendly examined the possibility of
jurisdiction under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 55 While acknowledging that the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States supports the proposition that a nation may regulate the
conduct of its citizens wherever that conduct may occur,5 6 the court

" Id. at 989 (footnote omitted). The court held that when fraudulent conduct occurring outside the United States has only a general detrimental "affect [sic] on the American economy or American investors," subject matter jurisdiction would not exist. Id. In
Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the court stated that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws have been "limited . . .to transactions
with which the United States ha[d] a significant connection or interest." Id. at 1194. See
also Note. supra note 36. 23 WASH. & LEE L. BEv. at 408-09.
49 519 F.2d at 1018; accord, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at 987. Although the liT court noted that its expansion of the extraterritorial application of the
securities laws was based on a fine distinction, it stated that "the line has to be drawn
somewhere." liT, 519 F.2d at 1018.
50 See liT, 519 F.2d at 1003.
51 See id. at 1005-14. The defendants were the organizers of Vencap and had purchased 5000 shares of its common stock for $5,000. IIT was induced to purchase Vencap's preferred stock at a cost of $3,000,000. Id. at 1005-06. Although IIT contributed
over 99% of Vencap's capital, it had only limited rights. The defendants controlled the
payment of dividends to IIT through a board of directors whom they had elected. Additionally, one of the defendants had encumbered over 20% of Vencap's capital to secure
a personal loan. Id. at 1012, 1013.
52 Id. at 1015. The requirement of complete diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970) was defeated due to the fact that plaintiffs and defendants both included some
foreigners. 519 F.2d at 1015.
53 Id. Pendent jurisdiction was defeated because it exists "only when there is a claim
conferring federal jurisdiction that will survive a motion to dismiss." Id.
54id. When an Act of Congress has its own jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1970) will not create jurisdiction over an action arising under that Act. 519 F.2d
at 1015. Since the 1934 Act has its own jurisdictional provision, § 1337 will not apply.
For the jurisdictional provision of the 1934 Act, see note 16 supra.
-5519 F.2d at 1015.
56 Id. at 1016. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 30(1)(a) (1965) states that a nation may "prescribe a rule of law (a)
attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state wherever the conduct
occurs." But cf. Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1199 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (fact that
American defendants are involved in the fraud is not a sufficient "effect" within the
United States for jurisdiction to attach).
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stated that it was unable to find an adequate congressional interest in
applying the federal securities laws to every situation where an
57
American defendant defrauds foreigners.
The Second Circuit did not find the Schoenbaum "effects" test
applicable to the lIT facts due to the lack of any evidence to indicate
that the fraudulent scheme "had a significant effect in the United
States." 58 Therefore, since the only remaining basis for subject matter
jurisdiction was activity within this country, 59 the court reviewed the
various acts which had occurred within the United States.6 0 These
acts included the use of a New York City office as a base of operations
wherein records were maintained and the drafting of agreements between IIT and Vencap by the defendants' New York attorneys in that
city. 6 ' Judge Friendly held that when the acts of fraud themselves
occur within the United States, the federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction. 62 This result was primarily based upon the
court's belief that Congress had not "intended to allow the United
States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security de63
vices for export, even when the[y] are peddled only to foreigners."
57 519 F.2d at 1016; see, e.g., Venture Fund (Int'l) N.V. v. Wilkie Farr & Gallagher,
418 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (insufficient for jurisdiction that some defendants
are American citizens); F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F.
Supp. 1219, 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)(same); Garner v. Pearson, [Current Volume] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,549, at 95,901, 95,905 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (the intent underlying
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act was not that of imposing liability simply because the seller
or purchaser is a United States citizen).
58 519 F.2d at 1016-17. Judge Friendly did not believe that the Schoenbaum "effects" test could be met simply because one half of one percent of the foreign investment fund's assets represented the portion held by Americans. Id. He further stated that
a sufficient congressional interest in applying the federal securities laws could not be
shown since "acts simply hav[ing] an adverse affect [sic] on the American economy or
American investors generally" were insufficient. 519 F.2d at 989; lIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d at 1017.
59 519 F.2d at 1017. Acknowledging that the lIT facts failed to meet the Schoenbaum "effects" test and that there was no direct effect upon an American citizen as in
Leasco, the court stated that " 'the absence of certain . . . elements which led to finding
subject matter jurisdiction in those cases does not necessarily preclude a similar conclusion on the different facts presented here.' " Id. (quoting from Bersch).
60 Id.

at 1018.
61 Id. The lower court found that the defendants' New York City office was used

both to formulate a great number of transactions and to initiate and receive mail that
was relevant to Vencap's business. Id.
82 Id. at 1018. The lIT court attempted to limit its holding to the fine distinction
between merely preparatory acts and fraudulent acts themselves. Thus, the court stated
that subject matter jurisdiction would exist only when fraudulent acts have occurred
within the United States. Id.; see notes 58-60 supra.
63 519 F.2d at 1017. The Second Circuit was of the opinion that Congress had not
"meant to prohibit the SEC from policing [fraudulent] activities within this country."
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Thus the action was remanded for additional hearings in district court
as to whether the activities within the United States amounted to
actual fraudulent conduct or were merely preparatory acts.6 4
When the Eighth Circuit was confronted with a transnational
securities fraud it looked to the Leasco decision for guidance.' 5 In
Travis v. Antes Imperial, Ltd. ,66 American shareholders of a Canadian
corporation, whose stock was neither traded nor listed on a domestic
exchange, were fraudulently induced to refrain from selling their
shares of stock. 6 7 The activity within the United States primarily consisted of telephone conversations and mailings, most of which were
initiated by the plaintiffs.688 The only other act which occurred within
the United States was the actual transfer of the stock at a time when
the plaintiffs were already aware of the fraud 6 9 but had apparently
decided that such action would minimize their losses. 70 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that when "significant conduct"
relevant to the fraud occurs within the United States the federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction. 71 The court, relying
upon the Leasco decision, stated that jurisdiction would not be destroyed simply because some of the fraudulent acts had occurred outside the United States or because the securities were not registered
or traded on an American securities exchange. 72 The Eighth Circuit,
Id. The court further justified its holding upon the policy consideration that this country
would desire that foreign nations prevent fraudulent securities from being exported to
the United States. Id.
Id. at 1019. The Second Circuit, however, retained jurisdiction over the appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970). 519 F.2d at 1019.
One commentator has attacked the court's attempt to distinguish fraudulent acts
from preparatory conduct stating that such a distinction "cannot be defended where
[the] preparation is essential for the ultimate consummation of the fraud." Comment,
supra note 17, 30 OHio N.U.L. REV. at 1327.
65 Travis v. Antes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 526 (8th Cir. 1973).
66 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
67 Id.
at 518-19, 521. It was alleged that the defendants had agreed to make a separate tender offer to the American shareholders so that the after tax result would be equal
to that received by the Canadian shareholders. Id. at 519. Because of this promise the
plaintiffs did not sell their stock at a time when a market existed. Id. at 521. Once all
the Canadians had been bought out, the defendants informed the plaintiffs that no acceptable tender offers would be forthcoming. Id. at 522-23.
68 Id.
at 526; see id. at 524-26.
69 Id.
at 521. The court held that even though the plaintiffs already knew of the
fraud when they sold their stock it would not alone be sufficient to defeat an action for
an alleged violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Id.
70
71

See id. at 522-23.
Id. at 524. The Travis court was then faced with the determination of whether the

defendants' activity within the United States amounted to "significant conduct." Id.
72

Id. at 526.
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finding that the telephone calls and mailings were essential to the
defendants' fraudulent scheme, held that subject matter jurisidiction
did exist. 73
The Third Circuit, when confronted with transnational securities
frauds, has also looked to the Second Circuit's decisions for guidance. 74 For example, in Straub v. Vaisman & Co. ,75 an American securities broker allegedly defrauded a European investor. 7 6 The fraudulent transaction was initiated and executed by the American broker in
the United States. 77 Additionally, the fraud involved stock registered
with the SEC and traded on an American securities exchange. 78 In
light of these significant contacts with the United States, the court
viewed the transaction as not being "predominantly foreign" in
character. 79 The Straub court reviewed the liT, Bersch and Leasco
decisions as well as the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, and had little difficulty justifying subject
matter jurisdiction. 8 0
Within a year of the Straub decision, the Third Circuit was again
presented with the problem of extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws in SEC v. Kasser.8 1 The facts
73Id. at 527.
74See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977);

Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1976).
75540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
76Id. at 594.
77Id. at 594, 595. The American broker employed a Mr. Charles Erb because of his
numerous contacts in Europe. Mr. Erb was subsequently held out to be the international operations director for Vaisman & Co. Id. at 594. The plaintiff purchased the
securities of Mark I upon the advice of Mr. Erb. Id. The defendants had failed to reveal
material information in violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. Id. The omissions included Mark I's imminent bankruptcy; that Vaisman & Co.
was a market maker [for] Mark I"; and that Vaisman was an officer and financial consultant of the selling corporation. Id. Based upon these facts, the Third Circuit found
the defendants' conduct " 'shocking to [its] conscience.' " id.
7sId. at 595. The securities involved were "traded on [the] American over-thecounter exchange." Id.
79
1d.
80 Id.

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES supports the proposition that conduct within the United States is sufficient for
jurisdictional purposes. See note 32 supra. The court was left with the question of
"whether, on policy grounds, [it] should apply the securities legislation." 540 F.2d at
595; accord, Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334-35. The Straub court was certain that it was
proper to apply the federal securities laws due to the substantial contacts with the
United States. 540 F.2d at 595. Since the court did not view the facts of the case as
presenting "a predominantly foreign transaction," it saw no reason to insulate the defendants for purely jurisdictional reasons. Id.; see notes 75-77 supra and accompanying
text.
8, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
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indicate that there was less contact with the United States than in
Straub.82 Furthermore, the action in Kasser was instituted by the SEC
primarily seeking injunctive relief.8 3 The Kasser court acknowledged
these factual differences, but held that Straub supported a finding of
jurisdiction because in that case the court had "flatly proclaimed that
conduct in this country, standing alone, is enough for jurisdiction to
84
attach under the federal securities laws."
Judge Adams, writing for the court, stated that in Kasser, as in
lIT, there was little evidence indicating that the fraud had a detrimental impact upon the United States. 85 Acknowledging the special
expertise of the Second Circuit, 8 6 he relied upon the lIT decision to
support the court's rejection of the Schoenbaum analysis that "effect"
within the United States is a prerequisite to a finding of subject matter jurisdiction.8 7 The Third Circuit then adopted Judge Friendly's
liT dictum that " 'it is hard to believe that Congress meant to prohibit the SEC from policing [fraudulent] activities within this country' " even when the sole defrauded party is a nonresident foreigner. 88
Following this approach, the court refused "to immunize, for strictly
jurisdictional reasons, defendants who" use the United States as their
base for transnational securities frauds.8 9 The Third Circuit found that
82 548 F.2d at 113.

93 Id. at 112; see note 3 supra
4 548 F.2d at 113. The Straub court had stated that "[c]onduct within the United
States is alone sufficient from a jurisdictional standpoint to apply the federal [securities]
statutes." 540 F.2d at 595. Although Kasser was arguably more foreign in nature than
Straub, the Kasser court found subject matter jurisdiction to exist under the 1933 and
1934 Acts. See 548 F.2d at 110-16; note 81 supra and accompanying iext. See also Mizrack,
supra note 27, at 368 ("no matter how 'foreign' a transaction might appear, there may
be elements within it, including conduct within the U.S. . . . which will" support a
finding of subject matter jurisdiction).
85 Compare Straub, 548 F.2d at 112 (court stating "it is questionable whether any
effect in the United States was wrought") with liT, 519 F.2d at 1016 (court found "little
factual support ...

that ...

activities had a significant effect in the United States").

86 548 F.2d at 115; see note 22 supra.
87 548 F.2d at 113. Commentators have expressed their belief that Leasco was the
first case to limit the Schoenbaum analysis and that Bersch and liT furthered the "effects" test rejection. See Mizrack, supra note 27, at 380; Note, supra note 17, 89 HAtV.
L. REv. at 557; 20 WAYNE L. REV. 167, 174-75 (1973).
88 548 F.2d at 114 (quoting from liT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1017). Judge Adams
agreed with Judge Friendly, in that they did not believe that Congress had intended for
the United States to become the center for fraudulent transnational securities schemes.
548 F.2d at 116; accord, liT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d at 1017.
89 548 F.2d at 114. The Third Circuit was confronted with a similar situation as was
posed in the lIT dicta. The Kasser court therefore readily admitted that it was "skeptical that Congress wished to preclude all SEC suits for injunctive relief where the victim
of a fraudulent scheme happens to be foreign." Id. Such relief was held to be appropriate since the defrauded foreign corporation was owned by a neighboring nation. Id.;
see text accompanying note 92 infra.
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the activities within the United States had been an essential part of
the fraudulent scheme, 90 thus clearly bringing the facts within the
liT holding which was limited to situations where "fraudulent acts"
themselves occurred within the United States. 91
The Kasser court held that when "at least some activity" in
furtherance of the fraud occurs within this country, subject matter
jurisdiction exists under the federal securities laws. 92 This result was
deemed "to be especially appropriate" because the defrauded corporation was "owned by a . . . governmental subdivision of a neighboring nation." 9 3 However, the court attempted to reconcile its decision
with Bersch94 which had held that jurisdiction exists over the claims
of foreigners only when acts within the United States directly cause
the loss. 95 Although the activity within the United States in both
cases appeared to be substantially the same, 96 Judge Adams stated
that there was "much more United States-based activity" in Kasser
90 548 F.2d at 115; see notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text. In SEC v. Capital
Growth Co., S.A., 391 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court held that when acts which
constitute "an essential part of the frau[d]" occur within the United States, subject matter jurisdiction exists. Id. at 597-98.
91 548 F.2d at 115. The district court, holding that the defendants had conducted
merely miscellaneous acts within the United States, attempted to distinguish the lIT
decison. Id. at 114. The Third Circuit, however, found the district court's interpretation
to be "too restrictive," id. at 112, and held that the liT decision supported jurisdiction
in Kasser due to the substantiality of the activities within this country. Id. at 114-15; see
notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
92 548 F.2d at 114; see Garner v. Pearson, [Current Volume] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
94,549, at 95,901, 95,905-06, (M.D. Fla. 1974); see Note, supra note 17, 69
COLUM. L. REV. at 111 ("[i]solated transactions ... should be subject to the [1934] Act
whenever there are sufficient minimal contacts with" the United States). But see Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at 993. (securities laws apply to foreigners only when acts
within the United States directly cause loss).
93 548 F.2d at 114; see note 1 supra. See also notes 103-09 infra and accompanying
text.
14 548 F.2d at 115. Although the liT decision was more on point, the Third Circuit
did not want to be in conflict with the Bersch decision. See id. The court, by making
factual distinctions, stated that there was nothing in Bersch to prohibit a finding of
jurisdiction in Kasser. Id.
95 519 F.2d at 993. In Bersch, the court had held that jurisdiction over the claims of
foreigners did not exist because the preparatory nature of the activities within the
United States. See id. at 993-97.
9 Compare the facts of Kasser, 548 F.2d at 111 (negotiations, execution of a contract, use of interstate commerce, incorporation of defendants or maintenance of a corporate office, use of a New York branch of a Swiss bank, maintenance of records, drafting
of agreements and transmittal of proceeds through the United States) with the facts of
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985 n.24, 990-91 (meetings, mailing of misleading prospectuses, use
of interstate commerce, incorporation of defendants, maintenance of some workpapers,
drafting of documents and processing money through a New York bank). See also Petitioners' Reply Memorandum at 3-5, Churchill Forest Indus. (Manitoba), Ltd. v. SEC,
431 U.S. 938 (1977) denying cert. to SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.).
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and classified these acts as being essential to the fraud. 9 7 He "question[ed] whether it [could] be convincingly maintained that such acts
within the United States did not directly cause any extraterritorial
losses." 9 Viewing the facts of Kasser in this light, the court was able
to state that there was nothing in Bersch which precluded a finding of
subject matter jurisdiction. 99
The Third Circuit also looked to the purposes underlying the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws and the rules promulgated thereunder.10 0 Judge Adams found that they were designed
to regulate conduct, there being no requirement that the attempted
fraud be completed as "a precondition to statutory liability."''1 1 In
addition, the securities laws were made expressly applicable to
foreign commerce, indicating a congressional intent that the acts
have "a broad jurisdictional scope." 10 2 The court concluded that regardless of where the actual loss occurred, if there were activities
within the United States which furthered the fraudulent scheme, the
03
federal district courts should have subject matter jurisdiction. 1
The Kasser court buttressed its finding of jurisdiction with three
policy considerations. 0 4 First, a failure to find jurisdiction would encourage individuals to use the United States as a base from which to
defraud nonresident foreigners. 10 5 The court did not believe "that
Congress intended . . . the United States to become a 'Barbary Coast'
• . . harboring international securities 'pirates.' "106 A second consid97 548 F.2d at 115. The court noted that the additional American activity included
"inter alia, the execution of a key investment contract in New York as well as the
maintenance of records in this country." Id. (italics in original).
98 Id. at 115; see note 89 supra and accompanying text.
99 548 F.2d at 115. The court so held despite the fact that in Bersch no jurisdiction
was found to exist over the claims of nonresident foreigners. Id.
0l Id. at 114.
101 Id. The Third Circuit was unable to find any section in the anti-fraud provisions

of the federal securities laws that would prohibit a finding of a jurisdiction "when the
actual locus of the harm is outside the . . . United States." Id. & n.22; see SEC v. Gulf
Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 994-95 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (fraudulent offers
within the United States are sufficient for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction even
though no sale occurred); notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text.
102 548 F.2d at 114; see note 18 supra and accompanying text.
103 548 F.2d at 114.

104 Id. at 116. The Third Circuit, recognizing its expansion of jurisdiction pursuant

to the federal securities laws offered policy considerations in justification of its holding.
Id.
105 id.

106 Id. If subject matter jurisdiction was found not to exist, the Third Circuit. feared
that they "would, in effect, create a haven for . . . defrauders and manipulators" in the
United States. Id; see 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 17, § 37.02, at 2-23; Comment, supra note
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eration was the possibility that a refusal to assume jurisdiction would
prompt "reciprocal responses on the part of other nations." 10 7 The
court expressed the hope that a finding of jurisdiction in Kasser would
influence other nations to protect American investors who might be
victimized by fraudulent schemes which are based overseas. 10 8 The
third justification was that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws "were designed to insure high standards of conduct in
securities transactions within" the United States. 10 9 Moreover, the
court found that a broad approach to subject matter jurisdiction is
required if the SEC is to more effectively supervise securities transactions within this country. 110 These policy considerations enumerated
by the court, standing alone, appear to be sufficient justification for
an expansive reading of the jurisdictional provision of the federal securities laws which would result in the application of the anti-fraud
provisions.
The Kasser court, in arriving at a finding of subject matter jurisdiction, attempted to come within the Bersch standard for nonresident foreign plaintiffs."' In order to find the requisite activities
within the United States which directly caused the losses, the court
placed what appears to be an artificial emphasis upon the execution of
an investment contract and the maintenance of records. 1 12 If this
Bersch standard, which requires that activities within the United
17, 30 OHIo N.U.L. REV. at 1319 (a finding against jurisdiction would encourage the
use of the United States securities markets in fraudulent schemes directed toward foreigners).
107 548 F.2d at 116. The court was of the opinion that a dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction might cause other nations to allow their countries to be used as a
base for exporting fraudulent securities to the United States. Id. Judge Friendly stated
in the liT decision that "[t]his country would surely look askance if one of our
neighbors stood by silently and permitted misrepresented securities to be poured into
the United States." liT, 519 F.2d at 1017.
108 548 F.2d at 116. But see Becker, ExtraterritorialDimensions of the Securities
Exchange Act, 2 INT'L L. & POL. 233, 241 (1969) (possible retribution by other nations).
109 548 F.2d at 116. The Straub court had indicated that "on policy grounds the
interest of the United States in regulating . . . conduct . . . in this country and enhancing
world confidence in its securities market is ample justification for applying the [federal]
securities laws." 540 F.2d at 595. See also SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474
F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1973) (broad construction of federal securities laws to promote
their "remedial purposes"); Comment, supra note 17, 30 OHIo N.U.L. REV. at 1317
("purification of American securities markets can only be achieved if a forum is available to all investors") (emphasis in original).
110548 F.2d at 116. Judge Adams believed that such an expansive reading of the
federal securities legislation would enhance its "basic purpos[e]" of maintaining the
high integrity of the United States securities markets. Id.
1I See id. at 115; notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text.
112 See 548 F.2d at 115.
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States be the direct cause of the loss, is to remain meaningful, then it
is questionable whether the reliance upon such tenuous factual distinctions is wise.
A distinguishing characteristic of the Kasser litigation was the
fact that the action was instituted by the SEC.1 13 The SEC has both
the special expertise and duty to insure the integrity of the United
States securities markets. This responsibility is an adequate justification for expanding subject matter jurisdiction under the federal securities laws beyond that ordinarily exercised on behalf of a private
plaintiff. The individual plaintiff normally seeks damages; the SEC
usually requests injunctive relief in order to prevent actions which
threaten the integrity of the United States securities exchanges. In
light of this, the Kasser court should not have been so concerned with
meeting established jurisdictional standards, but rather, should have
recognized that a different situation was involved, justifying an expansion of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the federal securities
laws.
Glenn Carl Guritzky
3 id. at 112.

